DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 654902
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:
THE APPLICATIONS (24A884, 24A885, AND 24A886) FOR PARTIAL STAYS ARE CONSOLIDATED AND DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT.
THE APPLICATIONS ARE SET FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT AT 10 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025.
SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 4/17/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
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OK Charter School Board v. Drummond
Docket Number: 24-394
Date Argued: 04/30/25
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24-394 OK CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD V. DRUMMOND
DECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1
CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-396 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.
CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court has applied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id. at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)).
Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education. These rulings implicate an entrenched circuit split and present two questions for review:
1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694
Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis
Docket Number: 24-304
Date Argued: 04/29/25
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24-304 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. DAVIS
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 489288
QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A FEDERAL COURT MAY CERTIFY A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(B)(3) WHEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED CLASS LACK ANY ARTICLE III INJURY. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.
CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55873
24-362 MARTIN V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 1716235 QUESTION PRESENTED:
Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception.
In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.
The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted). 2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10062 GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION’S SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WHEN THE NEGLIGENT OR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME NEXUS WITH FURTHERING FEDERAL POLICY AND CAN REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLYING WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FEDERAL LAW. 2) WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION IS CATEGORICALLY INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO TO THE INTENTIONAL TORTS EXCEPTION. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. CHRISTOPHER MILLS, ESQUIRE, OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. CERT. GRANTED 1/27/2025
Martin v. United States
Docket Number: 24-362
Date Argued: 04/29/25
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24-320 SOTO V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 1094 GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: GIVEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION UNDER 10 U. S. C. §1413a IS A CLAIM "INVOLVING ... RETIRED PAY" UNDER 31 U. S. C. §3702(a)(1) (A), DOES 10 U. S. C. §1413a PROVIDE A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM THAT DISPLACES THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE BARRING ACT? CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.
Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."
The question presented is: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2022-2011
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24-249 A.J.T. V. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 1058 CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a.
That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.
The question presented is: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1399
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